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INTRODUCTION

Alexander Bickel and Fritz Scharpf treated the political question
doctrine as one of the devices the Supreme Court could use in
structuring the way it interacted with the overall political system.'
Bickel in particular conceded that the Court had to justify the
decisions it made on the merits of constitutional questions by
invoking principle
The problem with principle, as Bickel and
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. I would like to thank Rachel Barkow, Susan Low Bloch, Steve Goldberg,
Heather Gerken, Vicki Jackson, and Louis Michael Seidman for their comments on drafts
of this Essay.
1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLmCS 183-97 (1962); Fritz W. Scharpf, JudicialReview and the
PoliticalQuestion: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE LJ. 517, 517 (1966).
2. I use the term principlein the sense made familiar by Herbert Wechsler. Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 passim
(1959). Wechsler argued that our legal system accommodated the power of judicial review
with democratic theory by insisting that judges exercise that power in a principled manner.
By principled, Wechsler meant that judges had to deploy rules that were neutral in the
sense that they did not systematically prefer one class of litigants to another except to the
extent that the rules the judges invoked made the characteristics of the favored class
relevant to the outcome. Id. at 15-16. For present purposes, I use a more modest and
defensible definition: principle means that the Court has to decide by invoking a rule-like
formulation that specifies the conditions under which one result rather than another
follows.
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Scharpf saw it, was that invoking a rule might be imprudent,
entangling the courts with the other institutions of the political system
in ways that would not benefit the nation.' The political question
doctrine, along with other justiciability doctrines, provided the Court
with techniques for refraining from deciding cases on the merits when
doing so would be imprudent.
The difficulty with this analysis is that the political question
doctrine is itself a rule, in the minimal sense that the Court has to
provide reasons for invoking it.4 In providing reasons for invoking
the doctrine, the Court creates a doctrine that inevitably undermines
the possibility of deploying the political question doctrine in the
service of prudent judgment, for it is precisely the characteristic of
prudential judgment that cannot be captured in rules. Bickel thought
that the political question doctrine "resists being domesticated." 5 By
that he meant that applying the doctrine inevitably required the
courts to respond to prudential concerns that could not be reduced to
rules, criteria, or even standards. He was wrong.
6 The Court treated
That, in short, is the story of Baker v. Carr.
the political question doctrine as a principle, as it had to within the
framework accepted by the Justices, that constitutional decisions had
to be principled.7 It thereby made the political question doctrine
effectively unavailable as a technique for coordinating the Court with
the nation's other political institutions. But, as Scharpf noted, the
political question doctrine did serve important functions for the Court

3. As Louis Michael Seidman, the constitutional law scholar, has pointed out to me,
for Bickel prudence might sometimes require the courts to refrain from acting because
acting would require that they pursue principle when a principled decision--one
compelled by law-would not benefit the nation.
4. Gerald Gunther's powerful criticism of Bickel's argument rested precisely on this
insight, although Gunther phrased the point differently. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principleand Expediency in Judicial Review, 64
COLUM. L. REV.1 passim (1964).
5. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 125.
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. Bickel's most effective arguments about prudence derived from his consideration
not of the justiciability doctrine but of the Court's discretionary power to deny review.
See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 1, at 133-43. Translating those arguments to the context of
doctrine proved impossible. And, even in the context of discretionary denials of review,
dissents from refusals to review cases routinely describe rule- or standard-like
considerations that the dissenters assert ought to govern the decision to review or not.
Finally, it may be worth mentioning that the very fact that the Court granted review in the
two 2000 election cases suggests that the Court sees a reduced role for prudential
considerations even at the stage of granting review.
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and the nation.' Not surprisingly, then, the concerns that made the
political question doctrine attractive before Baker v. Carr remained
important. Prudence simply migrated from the political question
doctrine to the law of standing. But, once again, standing is a legal
doctrine, and doctrinalization occurred again.
By the late 1990s, the justiciability doctrine had been thoroughly
domesticated. Baker v. Carr gave us a list of criteria for deciding
when to invoke the political question doctrine; 9 standing cases had
developed the litany of "injury, causation, and redressability" to
structure a purely doctrinal analysis. 10 By the turn of the century, a
complete transformation had occurred, as shown by the fact that only
old-fashioned scholars noted what prior generations would have
thought serious political question and standing problems in Bush v.
Gore." This is a transformation of constitutional consciousness that
can best be understood by historicizing the justiciability doctrines,
that is, by trying to identify the historical circumstances under which
those doctrines seemed appropriate vehicles for prudential judgments
and the circumstances that led later constitutional thinkers to
conclude that they were not such vehicles.
This Essay develops the foregoing argument by examining, in
Section I, the transformation of the political question doctrine from
Baker v. Carr through Walter Nixon v. United States.2 Section II
charts a similar, perhaps even more dramatic transformation of the
law of standing. 3 Section I then examines Bush v. Gore, explaining
how older doctrines of standing and political questions might have
been thought relevant there. 4 It argues as well that the very fact that
those doctrines went unmentioned by the Court shows why we must
take a historically grounded view of justiciability doctrines. Section
IV sketches the historical settings in which the political question
doctrine as a counsel of prudence arose and disappeared. 5 The
Conclusion suggests that, in the current historical period, a practice of
8. Scharpf, supra note 1, at 566-83, identifies the bases of the political question
doctrine to include functional reasons such as differential access to information and,
important in the present context, the responsibilities of the political branches.
9. 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
10. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-66 (1984) (denying standing to
litigants who did not allege facts showing that they had suffered an injury that a judicial
order would redress); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 21627 (1974) (denying standing to litigants who asserted only a generalized grievance).
11. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
12. 506 U.S. 224 (1993); infra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
13. Infra notes 52-94 and accompanying text.
14. Infra notes 95-124 and accompanying text.
15. Infra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
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judicial review constrained by prudence may be impossible to
retrieve.
I. BAKER V. CARR AND THE DOCIRINALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL
QuEsTIoN DOCTRINE

I begin, boringly, by quoting the familiar catalogue of criteria
Baker v. Carrdiscerned in the Court's political question cases:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.16

Louis Henkin provided the definitive guide to understanding this
catalogue in his challenge to the very existence of a political question
doctrine.' 7 According to Henkin, most of the political question cases
involved decisions by the Court (1) that the Constitution gave the
political branches discretion to decide what to do and the political
branches had not abused their discretion, or (2) that the Constitution
placed no limits on the discretion of the political branches to decide
what to do.' s Henkin's important point was that the Court's decisions
are on the merits. That is, the Court in these cases interprets the
Constitution to say one thing rather than another. Here Henkin drew
on a thought in Baker v. Carritself, arguing that no political question
arises when all the Court must do is engage in ordinary constitutional
interpretation. 9

16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
17. Louis Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?,85 YALE L.J. 597 passim
(1976).
18. Id.
19. For completeness, I would add that there is a cluster of cases involving foreign
affairs where the pull of some sort of political question doctrine seems strong. See, e.g.,
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (holding that "the
challenge to the [Secretary of Commerce's] decision not to certify Japan for harvesting
whales in excess of [International Whaling Commission] quotas presents a purely legal
question of statutory interpretation" and thus the political question doctrine does not bar
the Court's review of the decision); RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S
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Henkin also identified an important residual category, which in
my judgment provides the best explanation for whatever true political
question doctrine there is: "there might be constitutional provisions
which can properly be interpreted as wholly or in part 'selfmonitoring' and not the subject of judicial review. ' 20 Understanding
this suggestion requires that we resolve an ambiguity in Baker v.
Carr's reference to a "constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political branch."' 21 One possibility is that the "issue" is
the question presented on the merits, where we want to know the
right answer to a substantive constitutional question. The issue on
the merits in Baker v. Carrwas: Does the Constitution require some
degree of equality in apportionments? Marbury v. Madison, saying
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is," 22 strongly suggests that ordinary
constitutional interpretation, done by the courts, tells us the answers
to substantive constitutional questions.
For the political question doctrine to raise interesting questions
about the Marbury tradition, the "issue" to which the Court refers
must be different. For the political question doctrine, the "issue," in
the Court's sense, is: Who gets to decide what the right answer to a
substantive constitutional question is? Again, in Baker v. Carr, the
issue in this sense, is: Who gets to decide whether the Constitution
requires some degree of equality in apportionments? That is, the
Court asks: Does the Constitution give a political branch the final
power to interpret the Constitution?13
Self-monitoring provisions are those to which the answer is, Yes;
this provision gives Congress or the President the final power to
specify the meaning of the Constitution that the litigants have raised.
I have argued elsewhere that self-monitoring constitutional provisions
are those as to which we have some confidence that the political

THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 289-91 (4th ed. 1996) (describing the

cases).
20. Henkin, supra note 17, at 622-23.
21. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
23. In Baker, the question is: Does the Constitution give a political branch the final
power to determine whether the Constitution requires some degree of equality in
apportionments? In United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990), the question was:
Does the Constitution give Congress the ultimate authority to determine that a particular
bill is indeed one "for raising revenue" that must originate in the House of
Representatives?
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branches will do at least as good a job as the courts in interpreting the
Constitution.2 4
We are now in a position to understand why the political
question doctrine came under pressure once Baker v. Carr gave it the
form of law. Baker v. Carrmade it natural to reject political question
arguments by noting that only an ordinary question of constitutional
interpretation of the sort courts routinely answer was at stake.
Notions of judicial supremacy make doubtful any assertion that a
constitutional provision should be self-monitoring in Henkin's sense,
while skepticism about the ability of the political branches to behave
in a constitutionally responsible manner undermines the claim that
any constitutional provision should be self-monitoring in the sense I
have urged.
With this as background, I now review the Court's major political
question cases from Baker to Walter Nixon. Baker itself, of course,
asserted that the equal protection challenge it allowed to go forward
presented an ordinary question of constitutional interpretation:
"Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well
developed and familiar .... ,5 The post-Baker reapportionment
decisions illuminate what ordinary questions of constitutional
interpretation are, even though the reapportionment decisions are
not themselves political question decisions. 26 The post-Baker judicial
standards demonstrate judicial
creativity in constitutional
interpretation: If ordinary constitutional interpretation produces a
quite rigid one-person, one-vote rule, what if anything lies outside the
domain of ordinary constitutional interpretation?
The Court's answer is, "not much," when it rejects political
question arguments. Powell v. McCormack27 is the paradigm. The
House of Representatives refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell
because he had been the subject of public scandals. 2 Powell sought
24. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 10408 (1999).
25. Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
26. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 324 (1973) (requiring a state to make an
honest and good-faith effort to construct legislative districts of nearly equal population);
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-32 (1969) (developing standards for determining
when a deviation from one person, one vote is excessive); Avery v. Midland County, 390
U.S. 474,476 (1968) (applying the one-person, one-vote rule to a county commission).
27. 395 U.S. 486 (1969); see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478
U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (asserting that "under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary's
characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely
because our decision may have significant political overtones").
28. Powell,395 U.S. at 489-90 (referring to the House investigation of Representative
Powell's financial dealings).
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judicial relief. The House officers he sued said that the Constitution
gave the House the exclusive power "to Judge... the...
Qualifications of its own Members." 29 Powell said that this was a
textual commitment only of the power to determine whether
members satisfied the "qualifications" listed elsewhere in the
Constitution. The Court agreed, holding that the House lacked
power to refuse to seat a member who it conceded satisfied the
enumerated qualifications. 0 The analytic point is that the Court
applies ordinary processes of interpretation to the clauses that a
litigant claims commit the question to the political branches in
deciding whether a question is a political question. Powell and the
reapportionment cases following Baker v. Carr show how easy it is to
interpret the clauses at issue in order not to commit the question to
31
the political branches.
United States v. Munoz-Flores 2 has the same structure as Powell.
The Victims of Crime Act contained a provision added in the Senate
requiring people convicted of federal crimes to pay a special
assessment to a Crime Victims Fund. Munoz-Flores said that the
assessment violated the Constitution's requirement that "all Bills for
raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives. 3 3
The Court replied that Munoz-Flores could prevail only if the special
assessment provision was a "Bill for raising Revenues. ''3
Determining what the Constitution meant when it referred to such
bills was an ordinary question of constitutional interpretation. The
Court then held that the Origination Clause did not refer to
provisions aimed at funding particular programs, but only at bills that
support general government programs.
The Court's only recent decision purporting to invoke the
political question doctrine shows how hard it is to resist the pull of the
argument that the Court can come up with a constitutional
interpretation that answers what is said to be a political question, that
29. Powell, 395 U.S. at 513 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5).
30. Id.at 550. The Court's confidence in its role is suggested by the fact that it
reserved the question of whether it could review a decision by the House that a member
did not satisfy one of the enumerated requirements. Id at 521 n.42 ("[Flederal courts
might still be barred by the political question doctrine from reviewing the House's factual
determination that a member did not meet one of the standing qualifications. This is an
issue not presented in this case and we express no view as to its resolution.").
31. See also U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 458-59 (1992)
(rejecting a political question argument and finding justiciable a claim challenging
Congress's choice of methods of apportioning seats among the states).
32. 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
34. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 387-88.
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is, one as to which the answer must come from the political branches.
Walter Nixon v. United States 5 involved Judge Nixon's challenge to
the processes used in the Senate's impeachment trial that resulted in
his conviction. Having found that conducting trials of impeachments
before the entire Senate was, in the Senate's view, unduly
burdensome, the Senate adopted a rule that allowed testimony to be
presented before a committee, which would send to the entire Senate
the transcript and a report summarizing the testimony.3 6 Under this
procedure, not every Senator actually heard live witness testimony;
the Senate's vote on whether to convict was based on the transcript
and report. The relevant constitutional language is that the Senate
has "the sole Power to try all Impeachments."' 37 The term sole in this
provision might seem to stand in Judge Nixon's way, but he relied on
the proposition that the courts have the power to engage in ordinary
constitutional interpretation. What the Constitution meant, Judge
Nixon said, was that only the Senate-and no one else-could try him
for the offenses with which he was charged. But, he argued, the
Senate had to give him a trial, not some truncated proceeding: True,
the Senate has the sole power to try him, but it has to try him.
The Court seemed to hold that Judge Nixon's claim presented a
political question, concluding that "the word 'try' in the Impeachment
Trial Clause does not provide an identifiable textual limit on the
authority which is committed to the Senate."3
Justice White's
concurring opinion pointed out difficulties with that conclusion. His
example was this: No one would contend that the Senate had given a
judge a trial in any sense whatever if it followed a "practice of
automatically entering a judgment of conviction whenever articles of
impeachment were delivered from the House. '39 As Justice White
put it, in terms that recall the aftermath of Baker v. Carr, " 'try'
presents no greater, and perhaps fewer, interpretive difficulties than
some other constitutional standards that have been found amenable
to familiartechniques of judicialconstruction."40 He conceded that his
example involved an improbable hypothetical case, but emphasized
that, as long as the courts were able to say that something was not a
trial, the word "try" had a meaning the courts could discern.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

506 U.S. 224 (1993).
See id- at 227 n.1 (quoting the Senate rule).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
Walter Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 246-47 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 247 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).

2002]

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

1211

And, as it happens, elements of the Court's opinion seem to
agree with Justice White. The Court noted that "[t]he word 'try,'
both in 1787 and later, has considerably broader meanings than those
'41 That observation comes
to which [Judge Nixon] would limit it."
close to rejecting on the merits Judge Nixon's claim that he had not
received a trial within the meaning of the Impeachment Clause. As
Henkin noted, some cases described as posing political questions
actually involve only the question of whether the political branches
abused a discretion given them by the Constitution.4 2 Justice White
would have interpreted the Constitution to give the Senate
substantial discretion to specify trial procedures, that is, to pin down
in detail what the word try meant. But, Justice White said, and the
Court's discussion of the broad meanings of the word seems to agree,
that even though the Senate was given wide latitude in specifying trial
procedures, the courts are not precluded from deciding that the
Senate had abused the discretion the Constitution gave them to
define terms4 3
The Court engages in the interpretive enterprise all the time.
Though nominally holding that the case presented a political
question, Walter Nixon shows how difficult it is for the Justices to
assert unqualifiedly that a particular constitutional provision really
has no meaning the Court can identify. And, in a world where the
Court is comfortable with interpreting the Constitution and
uncomfortable with allowing anyone else to do so, once it is conceded
that a provision means something, the "textually demonstrable
commitment" element simply falls away.
Goldwater v. Carter,44 the only other recent case in which the
political question doctrine figured prominently, illustrates the
problem as well. The United States and the Republic of China,
located in Taiwan, had a mutual defense treaty, which the Senate had
ratified. The People's Republic of China insisted that the United
States abrogate the treaty if the United States and the People's
Republic were to have diplomatic relations. Acting without the
participation of the Senate, President Jimmy Carter announced that
41. Md at 229.
42. Henkin, supra note 17.
43. See also id. at 254 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that the
courts would have a role if "the Senate's action [was] ...so far beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority ...as to merit a judicial response").
44. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The case also indicates the pull of the foreign affairs context
on the political question doctrine. But see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y,
478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (rejecting the argument that the foreign affairs context of a
statutory interpretation case should limit the Court's role).
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the United States would abrogate the mutual defense treaty. Senator
Barry Goldwater challenged the abrogation, arguing that the
Constitution, in giving the Senate a role in creating treaties, also gave
it a role in abrogating them: the Constitution expressly said that
Senate agreement was necessary to enter into a treaty relation, and,
Senator Goldwater asserted, the Constitution should be interpreted
to require Senate agreement to get out of a treaty relation.
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected Senator Goldwater's
claim, with the Justices expressing a variety of views on why he
should not prevail. For present purposes, the position of then-Justice
Rehnquist, and the responses of Justices Brennan and Powell, are the
most important. Justice Rehnquist and three others found that
Senator Goldwater's claim raised a political question.4 In part that
was because of the foreign affairs setting. But, in addition, Justice
Rehnquist said that the Constitution committed the question of who
must participate in a treaty abrogation to the political branches.4 6 His
argument was that the Constitution expressly said that the Senate had
to participate in creating a treaty relation, and that, in saying nothing
about whether it had to participate in abrogating such a relation, the
Constitution implicitly left that question to the political branches to
resolve: "[W]hile the Constitution is express as to the manner in
which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, it is
silent as to that body's participation in the abrogation of a treaty."'47
Silence meant that the question was left to the political branches.
Justice Powell also did not reach the merits, believing that
Senator Goldwater's claim was not ripe, but he disagreed with Justice
Rehnquist's analysis. Justice Powell posed the following problem:
"Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty with a
foreign country and announced that it would go into effect despite its
rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. Justice Rehnquist's analysis that
situation would present a political question even though Art. II, §2,
But Justice Powell said, the
clearly would resolve the dispute."'
"legal issue" presented by a unilateral presidential commitment to a
treaty relation was no different from the legal issue presented by a
unilateral presidential decision to end such a relation: "In both cases,
the Court would interpret the Constitution to decide whether
congressional approval is necessary to give a Presidential decision on

45.
46.
47.
48.

Goldwater,444 U.S. at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1002-04 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id at 999-1000 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the validity of a treaty the force of law."4 9 The only difference, to
Justice Powell, was that his hypothesized case presented "textual"
analysis while Senator Goldwater's real one required "interstitial
analysis," that is, interpretation based on inferences from what the
Constitution said and what it did not say. Interstitial analysis, to
Justice Powell, was, like textual analysis, an exercise in ordinary
constitutional interpretation.
In reviewing this history, we see that the overall effect of Baker
v. Carr was what I have referred to as the doctrinalization of the
political question doctrine. The Court converted into a set of legal
rules an approach that had some flexibility and that therefore might
be invoked whenever a majority thought that the prudent course was
to avoid involvement in a constitutional dispute. Baker v. Carr
specified six elements of the doctrine and came to be understood as
insisting that at least one be present when the Court finds a case to
raise a political question 0 Even more, the Court has not invoked the
more obviously flexible criteria articulated in Baker v. Carr-thelast
four of the six on its list-in any recent case, to the point where it
seems fair to say that the only real components of the doctrine are the
first two: a textually demonstrable commitment to the political
branches and the lack of judicially manageable standards 5 '
As Bickel understood, however, prudent judgment cannot be
captured in rules. If, as Scharpf emphasized, techniques of avoiding a
decision for prudential reasons were functional for the Court, Baker
v. Carr'selimination of one such technique might compel the Court to
find another. For a while, the Court settled on the doctrine of
standing, but it too lost its functional value as an avoidance device as
it became doctrinalized. By the time that happened, the functional
need for avoidance doctrines disappeared.

49. Id (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
50. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONST1TrTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
119 (1997) ("Virtually every case considering the political question doctrine quotes [the
list of six factors]."). For the factors, see supra text accompanying note 16.
51. The Court has not explicitly reduced the doctrine to these two components, and
presumably the other four remain available in the event that the Court chooses to revive a
more discretionary doctrine than the one it has recently invoked. Still, it seems worth
noting that it would not have been difficult to say that deciding the merits of the question
presented in Powell v. McCormack would express a lack of respect for the House of
Representatives, and yet the Court did not do so.
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II. STANDING AS A PRUDENTIAL APPROACH AND ITS
DOCTRINALIZATION

Although sounding some prudential themes, Flast v. Cohen
initiated the doctrinalization of standing law. 2 The standing
doctrine's potential to replace the political question doctrine was
apparent in the Court's assertion that the Constitution's "case or
controversy" language "define[s] the role assigned to the judiciary in
a tripartite allocation of power to assure that the federal courts will
not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
' Justice Powell's observation in a case about standing,
government."53
that justiciability doctrines were "founded in concern about the
proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society," is to the same effect.5 4
A series of cases involving what the Court called "generalized
grievances" blurred the lines between standing law and the political
question doctrine. 5 United States v. Richardson denied standing to
taxpayers who challenged Congress's failure to disclose the budgets
of several national security agencies as a violation of the
Constitution's requirement that "a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published
from time to time."56 After saying that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they presented only a generalized grievance shared by every
taxpayer, the Court concluded:
It can be argued that if respondent is not permitted to
litigate this issue, no one can do so. In a very real sense, the
absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter
is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately
to the political process.5 7
This comes very close to asserting that the question presented was a
political one.
As a law of standing developed, the possibility of deploying it in
the service of prudent judgment disappeared, to be replaced by a
doctrinalized concern about congressional interference with the
52. 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (holding that taxpayers have standing to invoke federal
jurisdiction where they allege that tax money is spent in violation of constitutional
restraints on legislative power).
53. Id. at 95.
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498 (1975).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
56. ld. at 167-70 (citing U.S. CONsT. art I, § 9, cl. 7).
57. Id. at 179.
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executive's discretion to choose how to enforce the law. Standing
doctrine, that is, was transformed from something allowing the courts
to express a generalized concern about their role into a doctrine
about the division of power between Congress and the President.
The Court might have developed Flast v. Cohen in a way that
would have eliminated the standing doctrine entirely. It quoted
Baker v. Carr for its central proposition that standing required only
that the litigant have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 58 As scholars
noted, no one seriously pursues expensive litigation without doing the
best to present the strongest arguments to illuminate the questions
presented. 9 Were "concrete adverseness" the governing standard,
only quirky cases presented by pro se litigants would be dismissed on
standing grounds.
Perhaps because the Warren Court did not get a chance to push
its standing doctrine to maturity due to the fact Flast was decided
shortly before President Nixon's appointments transformed the
Court, the Court tried to define tests for identifying when concrete
adverseness existed. A shorthand summary of the modern test is that
standing law requires that a litigant have suffered a harm of a type the
courts are willing to acknowledge to be a harm, caused by
unconstitutional actions taken by the government defendants, and
likely to be eliminated or at least alleviated by some remedy the
courts are in a position to award.6
The law of cognizable harm developed along two tracks. In
terms of timing, the Court, influenced by the economic regulatory
programs associated with the New Deal, initially thought that
identifying cognizable harms was an essentially judicial task, albeit
sometimes with guidance from Congress.61 The Court rethought its
position as the Great Society Congresses enacted environmental and
consumer-oriented programs. The Court concluded that Congress
58. Flast,392 U.S. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962)).
59. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Standingin the Supreme Court: A FunctionalAnalysis,

86 HARV. L. RaV. 645, 674 (1973) (discussing the high costs of litigation to individual
plaintiffs as a deterrent against suits in which a plaintiff has no stake).
60. In what follows I focus on the problem of determining what are cognizable harms;
the contours of developments regarding causation and redressability are essentially the
same as the ones I describe with respect to harm.
61. See, e.g., FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470,475 (1940) (allowing a
competitor to challenge a grant of a radio license on the ground that the license did not
serve the public interest).

1216

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

had a large role in specifying constitutionally cognizable harm.62
Ultimately, the only constraint the Court recognized on Congress's
power to specify harms that give rise to standing was based on Article
II, not Article 111.63 Once that recognition occurred, the cases
involving judicial identification of cognizable harm could be seen in a
new light. They became cases in which standing would exist had
Congress conferred it. But, in the absence of congressional action,
the courts would say, in effect, "The injury you say you have suffered
simply does not count with us, even though it might be an injury in
some sense." And, in saying that, the courts necessarily decided that
the Constitution provided no remedy for that kind of injury. The
decisions, that is, were on the merits of the constitutional claims
presented.
To the extent that the courts had a doctrine of standing before
the New Deal, that doctrine required plaintiffs to allege that they
were injured in a way closely analogous to the injuries remedied in
traditional common law actions. 64 The government had to do
something that the courts saw as resembling a trespass onto the
plaintiff's land, for example. The rise of the administrative state
placed this notion of harm under such pressure that it simply
disappeared. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Stationss is usually cited as
the case where the Court abandoned the requirement of commonlaw-like injury. The radio station sought judicial review of an FCC
decision awarding a broadcast license to a competitor. The radio
station had no right to be free from competition, but, the Court held,
it could assert the general public interest in radio station licensing.
Sanders Bros. highlighted the legal realist point that harm was not a
category that existed in the natural world. It was, rather, a category
created by law. Congress might identify special harms that the courts
would not, but the conceptual underpinnings of Sanders Bros. showed
that decisions, whether by Congress or by the courts, treating some
things as harms and others not as harms were exercises of law-making
power.

62. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-41 (1972) (denying standing in
the particular case, but acknowledging that esthetic, conservation, or recreational harm
could support standing).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
64. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 101 (4th ed. 2001) ("In
the early days of standing doctrine-the first decades of the twentieth century-a common
law interest was often treated as a necessary basis for standing.").
65. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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The critical development came when the Court recognized that
Congress could actually create interests, the infringement of which
would cause constitutionally cognizable harm.66
Classical
environmental law protected people against nuisances, which were
readily assimilated to common law trespass; modem environmental
law protected people against injuries to their esthetic interests, which
had no obvious common law analogues. The Freedom of Information
Act gave everyone an interest in access to government information,
an interest for which there was no obvious common law analogue.
Racial discrimination was similar to classical harms; refusing to show
available apartments to racial "testers" who had no interest in renting
was not.67 The Court conceptualized the testers' interest as one in
acquiring information. It knew, of course, that such an interest arose
not from anything analogous to practices causing common law harms
but simply from the fact that Congress wanted information about
apartments distributed without regard to race.
The Court's decisions restrictingstanding in the modem era are
to some extent misleading. With respect to harm, their sole focus was
whether the particular plaintiff had in fact suffered harm to an
interest created by Congress. The most dramatic example of this
phenomenon is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.' The case involved a
challenge to a rule interpreting the Endangered Species Act to apply
only to projects within the United States or on the high seas. The
plaintiffs were environmentalists whose affidavits alleged that they
had traveled abroad, and intended to continue such travel, to view
endangered species whose habitats were threatened by projects
receiving support from the U.S. government. A majority of the Court
found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that they would be harmed
by the failure to apply the Act to those projects. 69 But, it turned out,
the problem was that the plaintiffs said only that they hoped to travel
abroad in the future. A majority of the Justices indicated that the
plaintiffs would have had standing if they had had concrete plans to
engage in that travel. As many have observed, a law of standing that

66. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) ("Congress may enact
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury
would exist without the statute.").
67. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-80 (1982) (finding standing
for an African-American "tester" who had no interest in renting but who had received
discriminatory misrepresentations, where Congress had acted to assure that
representations about apartment availability would be made in a nondiscriminatory way).
68. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
69. Ido at 562-64.
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can be satisfied by buying a ticket to fly to Egypt is not doing much
serious work.7 °
The plaintiffs in Lujan also sought standing under a citizen-suit
provision allowing "any person" to bring suit. They argued that the
provision gave standing because it created an interest in seeing that
the law was obeyed. 71 More important for present purposes, they
argued that the cases acknowledging congressional power to create
interests that, if infringed, gave rise to standing allowed Congress to
create precisely the interest in seeing the law obeyed. The Court
invoked the principle barring courts from hearing cases that present
only generalized grievances to dismiss this claim. It acknowledged
that the prior cases had not involved claims based on statutory
provisions giving anyone a right to sue, but denied that that
distinction mattered. It continued,
Vindicating the public interest ... is the function of
Congress and the Chief Executive .... To permit Congress
to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right"
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most
important constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed." 72
With this, standing shifted from Article III to Article II, at least
when a litigant relied on a congressional statute purporting to confer
standing.73
FederalElections Commission v. Akins74 seems to transform the
generalized grievance rule. A Federal Election Campaign Act
provision broadly allowed "any party" who thought the Commission

70. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," andArticle III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
71. Id. at 576-77.
72. Id. at 576 (quoting U.S. CONsT. Art II, § 3).
73. But see Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813 (1997) (applying general standing
doctrine without discussing the fact that a statute may have specifically conferred
standing). There the Court denied standing to a member of Congress challenging the Line
Item Veto Act because Congress's members did not have a sufficient personal stake in the
dispute and did not allege a sufficiently concrete injury. The statute authorized suit by
"[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected" by the Act, 2 U.S.C.
§ 692 (a)(1) (2000). The Court appears to have read this provision as requiring that the
members of Congress authorized to sue must be adversely affected as the Court had
traditionally interpreted that phrase. This is not the most natural reading of the provision,
because it makes the reference to members of Congress redundant (a member of Congress
adversely affected is necessarily an individual adversely affected).
74. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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erred in dismissing a complaint to seek judicial review.7
The
plaintiffs thought the Commission had committed legal error in
failing to require a political action committee to disclose information
that the statute required to be disclosed. The Court agreed that the
plaintiffs had standing. It said that the Commission's "strongest
argument is its contention that this lawsuit involves only a
'generalized grievance.' "76 The Court said that its prior cases
invoking the generalized grievance rule involved what the Court
called "abstract and indefinite" harms that were also widely shared.77
"The abstract nature of the harm... deprives the case of the concrete
specificity" that Article III requires.78 It contrasted such harms with
widely shared harms that are "concrete." Informational injury, that
is, the deprivation of access to information that Congress wanted
available, was a widely-indeed, I would think, universally-shared
concrete harm, whereas the "interest in seeing that the law is obeyed"
was a widely, indeed perhaps universally, shared abstract harm.
The distinction between widely shared abstract harms and widely
shared concrete ones remains undeveloped and unclear. Still, take
the rule that standing exists when a plaintiff alleges a widely shared
concrete harm to an interest Congress wanted to protect, join it with
the rule that plaintiffs can show individualized harm to such interests
by careful pleading, and we have a law of standing that comes close to
requiring the minimal concrete adverseness that Flast v. Cohen
identified as the constitutional requirement.
Some qualifications are necessary.
First, the concrete
adverseness requirement probably still does screen out the frivolous
pro se litigant. Second, standing law now has an Article II basis 79- but only when the litigant challenges actions by federal executive
officials, a much smaller class of cases than the one to which earlier
standing doctrine applied. Third, as the Court in Akins said, the fact
that an injury is widely shared might "counsel[] against ...
interpreting a statute as conferring standing."8 So, to the extent that
standing law is not Article II law, it is now a law about rules of
statutory interpretation.
75. 2 U.S.C. § 437(g)(a)(8)(A) (2000).
76. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 24.
79. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,577 (1992) (disallowing Congress
to permit individual citizens to sue executive officials in order to see that the laws are
properly executed); see also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
80. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24.
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After the Court acknowledged broad congressional power to
identify constitutionally cognizable harms, limited only by Article II,
judicial decisions about which harms gave rise to standing and which
did not became transparently decisions on the merits, rather than
decisions about some question prior to the merits. Northeastern
Florida General Contractors v. Jacksonville,"' read against the
background of Allen v. Wright,2 demonstrates the inseparability of
the merits from the supposedly antecedent question of harm. The
Internal Revenue Code allows private schools to obtain tax exempt
83
status, but only if they do not discriminate on the basis of race.
Allen v. Wright rejected a challenge to the methods the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS"), constrained by congressional dictates, used
to determine whether private schools receiving such exemptions were
in fact operating without racial discrimination.84 The parents of
African-American school children, who alleged that the assertedly
feeble IRS enforcement program violated their constitutional rights,
brought the challenge. The Court held that the plaintiffs did not have
standing.8 5
Allen v. Wright contained several themes. One touched on
Article II concerns: The Court noted the principle "'that the
Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the
"dispatch of its own internal affairs." ' "86 It cited Article II in
support of its observation that the principle, "[w]hen transported into
the Art. HI context, ... counsels against recognizing standing in a

case brought.., to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established
by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal obligations." 7 My present
concern is with the way in which the Court dealt with one of the
alleged harms, characterized by the Court as a claim of stigmatic
injury. That is, the plaintiffs said that the IRS's feeble enforcement
effort communicated a message to them and others that the interests
of African Americans in reducing discrimination were not worth
serious consideration. The Court said that this did not "constitute

81. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
82. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
83. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
598-99 (1983) (holding that a racially discriminatory private school was not entitled to taxexempt status as a charitable institution).
84. Allen, 468 U.S. at 739-40.
85. Id. at 740.
86. Id. at 761 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,378-79 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,896 (1961))).
87. Id.

2002]

POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE

1221

judicially cognizable injury."' The Court in Allen v. Wright tried to
explain why it should not recognize stigmatic injury as a
constitutionally cognizable harm: "A black person in Hawaii could
challenge the grant of a tax exemption to a racially discriminatory
school in Maine." 9 Stigmatic injury, that is, was a generalized
grievance, and the law of standing precluded courts from hearing
cases resting on generalized grievances.
In NortheasternFlorida General Contractors,' the plaintiffs were
a group of contractors who challenged a local affirmative action
program that set aside a portion of city contracts for minority
contractors. 91 The court of appeals denied standing because none of
the plaintiffs alleged that it would have been awarded a contract had
there been no set-aside program. 92 The Supreme Court reversed,
saying that the contractors' injury was the denial of an opportunity to
compete on an equal footing, not denial of the contracts themselves. 93
Taken together, Allen and Northeastern illustrate that denial of
an opportunity, even if having the opportunity would not eventuate in
any material benefit to the plaintiff, is a judicially cognizable injury,
while suffering from communications by the government that devalue
one's race-based concerns is not. This conclusion suggests that the
courts recognize injuries pretty much by fiat: This one counts, that
one does not. Or, more precisely, as a matter of substantive
constitutional interpretation, the Constitution does not protect
African Americans against stigmatic injury, while it does protect
against denials of opportunity to compete on an equal basis. One can
defend both of those conclusions in substantive constitutional terms,
but the defense would operate on the level of substance, not on the
level of standing to sue. Further, if the problem in Allen was that the
88. Id at 753.
89. Id at 756.
90. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
91. Id at 659 (describing the plaintiffs as not qualifying as "Minority Business
Enterprises" under the Jacksonville ordinance).
92. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217,1219 (11th Cir. 1992).
93. City of Jacksonville,508 U.S. at 666. The Court wrote:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for members
of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a
member of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that
he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish
standing. The "injury in fact" in an equal protection case of this variety is the
denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the
ultimate inability to obtain the benefit.
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case presented only a generalized grievance, it is hardly obvious that
one can consistently assert both that stigmatic injury suffered, on the
Allen litigants' theory, only by African Americans, is a generalized
grievance and that denial of the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis suffered in NortheasternFlorida Contractorsby all non-minority
contractors is not.94
Even if one can distinguish between Allen and Northeastern
Florida Contractors in some way that does not ultimately define
injury with reference to the merits of the constitutional claim, other
difficulties remain. The Court's recognition of congressional power
to create standing in large classes of citizens-in effect, to make
generalized grievances justiciable-is in tension with the notion that
the Constitution relegates the resolution of generalized grievances to
Congress. Because Congress has the power to confer standing, the
only real question in any standing case should be whether Congress
has done so-that is, how the courts should interpret the statutes
under which they act.
The rule from the Court's cases, then, is that the Constitution
requires something other than an assertion of a generalized grievance.
Thus, Congress can resolve the problem, unless Congress wants the
courts to resolve it, in which case the Constitution requires the courts
to do Congress's bidding, unless doing so would interfere with the
President's duty to execute the laws. The law of standing, once fully
doctrinalized, becomes a combination of a narrow Article II-based
rule and some presumptions about how to interpret statutes. As with
the political question doctrine, the law of standing can no longer be
the vehicle for the expression of prudential judgments about when the
courts might properly participate in resolving questions about the
overall operation of our system of government.
III. THE SILENCES OF B USH V. GORE

Judicial conservatives of a prior generation would at least have
worried about the justiciability of the challenges raised in Bush v.
Gore. They would have noticed standing and political question
problems in the case. What accounts for the striking silences about
those problems in the Court's opinion finding an equal protection
94. Perhaps the distinction introduced in Akins between abstract and concrete
generalized grievances might be developed in a way that shows why a stigmatic injury is
abstract while the denial of the opportunity to compete on an equal basis is concrete.
What that account might be, however, is unclear to me; stigmatic injury seems to me fairly
described as concrete.
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violation and in the opinion for the three Justices finding a violation
of Article 1H?
The facts of Bush v. Gore need no restating. 95 A majority of the
Supreme Court held that the system devised by the Florida Supreme
Court violated principles of equal protection. 96 The standing problem
is this:97 We can identify two equal protection problems that might
arise from the recounting system. First, the system might have been
skewed, intentionally or otherwise, to favor Vice President Gore by
making it more likely that new votes for him would turn up than
would new votes for Governor Bush. On this theory the equal
protection problem is a straight-forward one of partisan vote dilution.
Either Governor Bush or a Florida voter who voted for Governor
Bush would clearly have standing.
Unfortunately, that is not the theory the Court adopted. Instead,
the Court said that the constitutional violation occurred because the
recount system did not guarantee that ballots cast by voters in
different precincts that either were identical in physical appearance or
otherwise equally reflected a clear voter intent would be given
identical treatment (whether counted or cast aside). Why should
Governor Bush have standing to raise this claim? One thing should
be obvious: Governor Bush cannot assert standing on the ground
that the constitutional flaw in the recount system adversely affected
him. The flaw identified by the Supreme Court majority has no
systematic relationship to votes for either candidate: On the Court's
analysis, a recount conducted under the Florida court's system might
have produced more votes for Governor Bush, not Vice President
98
Gore.

95. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
96. Id. at 106 ("The want of those rules here has led to unequal evaluation of ballots
in various respects.").
97. For a more complete analysis, see Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection:
Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, & THE
SUPREME COURT 77-97 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (discussing
how the Court's equal protection analysis in Bush v. Gore and recent cases indicates
skepticism for Congress's motives and competence) [hereinafter Karlan, Newest Equal
Protection];Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
Protectionfrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1356-66 (2001)
(analyzing the standing of individual Florida voters as well as the candidates for President
in the 2000 presidential race in light of wrongful districting standing decisions).
98. Perhaps we might defend the Court's rule as a prophylactic one guarding against
partisan vote dilution that is difficult to detect. If so, a person claiming to have been the
victim of partisan vote dilution would have standing to raise the equal protection claim the
Court recognized.
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A more plausible argument about standing is also more complex.
On the Supreme Court's analysis, we know that there is a group of
voters whose votes might not be counted when physically identical
ballots were counted. It would be a miracle if no Bush voters were
among that group. But no individual Bush voter can confidently
assert that her ballot would not be counted. Governor Bush might
then have third-party standing to assert the interests of the Bush
voters among the group disadvantaged by the recount system.
Equally, of course, Vice President Gore would have standing to assert
the interests of the Gore voters in that group. This leads one to
wonder whether, with respect to the constitutional violation the Court
actually found, the case should have been seen as non-adversarial. 99
An even more plausible argument for standing exists. Richard
Pildes has identified a distinct form of injury associated with certain
Pildes
voting systems, which he says work expressive harm."°
developed the concept to deal with the problems of finding standing
under traditional notions of injury in cases involving race-conscious
districting. 0 ' Pamela Karlan has suggested that Bush v. Gore also
involves this sort of harm, worked by a flaw in the election process of
a sort that does not generate identifiable individuals who have
suffered from having their votes diluted or otherwise devalued."m
Pildes and Karlan point out that anyone within a jurisdiction
operating a voting system that implicates expressive discrimination
has standing to raise the objection. 0 3 That idea, however, raises
another problem. As we have seen, the Court has said that the very
fact that anyone can raise a particular constitutional claim is a reason
for denying standing to all °n Standing so broadly available
demonstrates that the plaintiff has a generalized grievance better
99. Perhaps we might develop an idea of "pendent" standing, which would operate
like this: A litigant clearly has standing to raise legal argument X, but the court rejects
that argument while accepting another argument Y, which the litigant would not otherwise
have standing to raise. Pendent standing allows the court to enter a judgment predicated
on argument Y even though it would not have been able to do so had the litigant raised
only argument Yin the complaint.
100. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REv. 483, 486 (1993) (arguing that "district appearance claims" work "expressive harms"
rather than material harms because they center on the perceived legitimacy of structures
of political representation instead of on the distribution of power between political

groups).
101. Id. at 513-16.
102. Karlan, Newest Equal Protection,supra note 97, at 1356-64.
103. Once again, this approach suggests that the litigation on the legal issue the Court
accepted in Bush v. Gore was nonadversarial.
104. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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addressed through the political process than through constitutional
adjudication. 5
The answer to this objection, if there is one, comes from Baker v.
Carr itself. It is that equal protection claims of any sort, including
claims of expressive harm, are justiciable. To quote the key passage
from Baker v. Carr again, "Judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause are well developed and familiar."'" The Bush v.
Gore Court's reluctance to commit itself to any equal protection
doctrine casts some shadows on an approach that would allow
standing in anyone to raise any equal protection claim, 7 but Baker v.
Carr, supplemented by later voting discrimination cases, at least
provides some basis for finding standing in Bush v. Gore.
No one would today contend that the equal protection claim in
Bush v. Gore raised a political question. The argument accepted by
three Justices in their concurring opinion that the Florida Supreme
Court's action violated Article II is another matter. 0 8 The argument
they accepted was that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Florida statutes regulating elections and recounts was so eccentric
as to amount to a judicial displacement of the power committed by
the Constitution to the state legislature to direct how presidential
electors are to be appointed. But, critics suggest, the Constitution

105. I have been discussing who might have standing, at the outset, to raise the equal
protection claim the Court recognized. Perhaps, however, the only relevant question is
whether Governor Bush had standing at the Supreme Court level. (State courts need not
restrict standing to litigants who satisfy the federal Article III standards.) There, he could
claim that the Florida Supreme Court's action deprived him of a victory; that is, his claim
would not be against anything associated with the recount, but would be against the
Florida Supreme Court's decision. Cf. ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 624 (1989)
(finding that litigants who might not have had Article III standing nonetheless had
standing to raise, in the Supreme Court, the claim that the appealed state court decision
itself injured them; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia dissented on this issue, and
Justice O'Connor did not participate in the decision).
106. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962). Erwin Chemerinsky argues that Baker v.
Carr found justiciability not for all equal protection claims associated with elections, but
only for cases claiming malapportionment. Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not
Justiciable,76 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1093,1108 (2001).
107. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities.").
108. For a more complete analysis of the political question issue, see Samuel
Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GoRE, & THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 97, at 55.
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committed the decision about whether there had been such a
displacement to Congress. 1"9
There appears to be an emerging consensus that the Article II
issue in Bush v. Gore was indeed a political question. 110 The relevant
clauses are in the Twelfth Amendment. Much in the argument for
the proposition that the Article II issue presented a political question
turns on what I call the atmospherics of the Twelfth Amendment.
Reading the Amendment, one certainly gets the general impression
that Congress was supposed to play a large, and perhaps the only, role
in resolving contested presidential elections. Certainly nothing in the
Amendment refers directly to a judicial role in resolving such
elections. Still, the political question doctrine, considered as a
doctrine, requires not atmospherics but an analysis of constitutional
text.
Atmospherics may influence the way one looks at constitutional
text, however. In Walter Nixon, the Supreme Court framed its
discussion of the meaning of the word try by first discussing the
meaning and role of the word sole in the phrase, "sole Power to try all
Impeachments.""'
Formally speaking, that analysis was not
responsive to Judge Nixon's claim, but the atmospherics of the
impeachment clause seem to have induced the Court to find that
there were no judicially manageable standards for determining the
meaning of try.
The precise question to ask is: Is there a demonstrable textual
commitment of the Article II question to Congress? Here it is
important to describe the Article II question carefully. The Article II
question is not a general or abstract one, such as: Does the
Constitution give the courts a role in resolving disputed presidential
elections? Rather, it is this: Did the Florida Supreme Court exceed
the discretion granted it by the Florida legislature in interpreting
Florida election law as applied in a presidential election? The
political question issue, then, is whether there is a textually
demonstrable comnmitment to the political branches of the power to
109. See Steven Calabresi, A PoliticalQuestion, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF
LEGITIMACY (2002); cf.Chemerinsky, supra note 106, at 1105-09 (arguing that the equal
protection claim also presented a political question).
110. In addition to Calabresi, supra note 109, see also Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court?: The Fall of the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002); JESSE H. CHOPER, WHY THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE DECIDED THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000 (Univ. of

Calif.-Berkeley Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
65,2001) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
111. 506 U.S. 224,229 (1993) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5).
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answer that question. The answer might be influenced by the
atmospherics of the Twelfth Amendment, but it cannot be
determined by language in that Amendment dealing with problems
other than the one presented in Bush v. Gore.
The political question argument gets its force from the provision
on counting the ballots cast by the electors: "[T]he President of the
Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted."' 2 The Constitution says that the Senate and the House
shall be present, and says nothing about judges having any role.
Further, if no candidate has a majority of the electoral votes cast and
counted (by whatever means), the choice of who is to become
So far,
President devolves upon the House of Representatives.
then, the Twelfth Amendment does not seem to contemplate a role
for the courts.
There is more to say, however. Start with the passive voice:
"shall then be counted." Does the constitutional text commit to
anyone in particular resolution of disputes over which votes should be
counted? Here the problem is analogous to that in Goldwater v.
Carter."4 There the Constitution said something about entering
treaties but nothing about getting out of them; here the Constitution
says something about counting electoral votes but nothing about what
to do when someone says, "This isn't a valid vote." In Goldwater,
then-Justice Rehnquist treated constitutional silence as supporting
the conclusion that the political question doctrine made
nonjusticiable the claim that the Senate had to participate in treaty
abrogation." 5 Perhaps, however, the foreign affairs context made
Goldwater special for Justice Rehnquist." 6 The domestic context of
Bush v. Gore may have allowed him and Justices Scalia and Thomas
to treat the constitutional silence over resolving disputes over
electoral votes as permitting courts to exercise their traditional role of
7
interpreting the Constitution, as Justice Powell said in Goldwater."
With this view of the Twelfth Amendment in hand, we can
examine a simpler defense of the proposition that the Constitution
did not commit the Article II claim to Congress. The Twelfth
Amendment begins with the words, "The Electors shall meet in their
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
Id
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
IM (noting that the case "involves foreign relations").
IM at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
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respective states."" 8 The dispute in Bush v. Gore involved identifying
exactly who the electors were, and nothing in the Twelfth
Amendment suggests that resolving disputes over identity is
committed to Congress." 9 The electors referred to in the Twelfth
Amendment are the Bush electors, if that Amendment restricts a
state legislature's ability to delegate interpretive authority to state
courts, or if the Florida Supreme Court exceeded the bounds of what
the legislature had delegated to it. The questions of whether the
Amendment does restrict state legislatures and whether the Florida
Supreme Court acted impermissibly are classically legal questions
ordinarily committed to the courts for resolution.
It is at the least not obvious that the Constitution contains a
demonstrable textual commitment of the Article II question to
Congress. The availability of judicial standards to determine whether
the Florida Supreme Court so deviated from ordinary statutory
interpretation as to displace the legislature as the body defining the
manner of selecting electors is clear, no matter how controversial the
application of those standards might be. This question involves no
"initial policy determination," and of course there was no "political
decision already made" that counseled in favor of "unquestioning
adherence."'12 0
The only component of the Baker v. Carr standards that might
support the conclusion that the Article II claim presented a political
question, other than the "textual commitment" standard, is that
"undertaking independent resolution" might "express[] lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government."'' After all, nothing
in the Constitution says that Congress cannot resolve disputes over
who the electors are or over which votes should be counted.'2
Further, the most cogent retrospective defenses of Bush v. Gore are
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
119. Perhaps one can read the Twelfth Amendment to remit to Congress the choice of
which electors to count in the event that it receives two slates from a single state. A
federal statute establishes an elaborate procedure for Congress to use in making that
choice, which commentators have taken as indicating Congress's belief that it had at least
the first word in determining which votes to count. But, of course, that is true of all
constitutional questions. It is not clear to me that the enactment of a statute governing
how to count disputed electoral slates demonstrates that the Constitution gives Congress
both the first and last words on which slate should be counted.
120. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
121. Id
122. And, of course, in the nation's only prior experience with a similar election
problem, the 1876 election, Congress did resolve these questions by appointing a
commission whose report it adopted. See CHARLES FARMAN, FIVE JUSTICES AND THE
ELECrORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (1988).
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that the Court acted properly to avert a constitutional crisis."2 Yet,
that crisis would have consisted of actions by one of the political
branches, and perhaps both.124 Suggesting that the courts must act
because the political branches would, if left alone, provoke a
constitutional crisis seems rather close to expressing a lack of the
respect due those branches.
What is most notable about Bush v. Gore in the present context
is that no one said anything at all about justiciability questions. I do
not claim that the case should actually have been dismissed for lack of
standing or because it raised a political question. I do claim that the
justiciability questions are obvious to someone schooled in the Bickel
tradition, and that to such a person, the silence in Bush v. Gore about
justiciability is quite remarkable. But, of course, a person attuned to
the justiciability questions is a person whose legal consciousness was
shaped in a period that has now passed.
IV. BICKEL'S WORLD, AND

OURS 125

Bickel gave a catalogue of "the foundation[s]" of the political
question doctrine that sounds quite different from the doctrinalized
criteria in Baker v. Carr:
(a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to
principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it,
which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety,
not so much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as
that perhaps it should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a
mature democracy"), the inner vulnerability, the self-doubt
of an institution which is electorally
irresponsible and has no
126
earth to draw strength from.
Bickel's catalogue not only sounds quite different from Baker v.
Carr's, it invokes prudential concerns quite remote from the legal
123. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001) (discussing the presidential election of
2000 and legal aftermath, as well as defending the Court's intervention because of the
political and constitutional crisis).
124. The characterization of action by the political branches as a crisis depends in
addition on the delay occasioned by the necessity for the political branches to act. The
idea appears to be that there was a crisis because the nation might not know who its next
president would be until January. There are, however, many things a nation's people
would benefit from knowing earlier rather than later, such as next year's inflation rate, and
in the circumstances of late 2000, uncertainty about who the President would be does not
seem much different from many of those other things.
125. The title intentionally echoes Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel's Law School and Ours,
104 YALE LJ. 1853,1853 (1995), and the argument is at least kin to Burt's.
126. BICKEL, supranote 1, at 184.
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ones Justice Brennan articulated. Bush v. Gore shows how foreign
Bickel's intellectual universe is from ours. In particular, Bickel's
catalogue includes items arguably not present in Bush v. Gore:
anxiety and self-doubt.
The equal protection question was strange, as the Court's
reluctance to develop any doctrine indicates, but as the aftermath of
Baker v. Carr showed, initial strangeness does not foreclose the
possibility of developing principles (in the Wechslerian sense) to
resolve it and its cousins. The issue in Bush v. Gore was
unquestionably momentous, and virtually everyone thinks that
someone's judgment was distorted: Bush's supporters think that the
justices of the Florida Supreme Court were out of control, 127 and Vice
President Gore's supporters think that the U.S. Supreme Court's
majority acted in an entirely partisan manner. 12
More interesting, I think, is that Bickel's remaining items make
no appearance in Bush v. Gore. Anxiety never attended the Supreme
Court majority's decision, and particularly not anxiety over the
possibility that the nation would comply with a mistaken decision. A
certain kind of positivism seems to have settled in along with the
nation's acceptance of a theory of strong judicial supremacy.1 29 That
is, our only worry is that the nation will not comply with the Court's
decisions. Compliance is unproblematic because we no longer have
available to us the sense that a Court decision might be mistaken.
Nor, finally, did anyone on the Court demonstrate self-doubt or a
sense of inner vulnerability.
The proximate reason for the foreignness of Bickel's formulation
to today's constitutional sensibility, I think, is the acceptance in our
political and legal culture of a strong form of judicial supremacy that
was only uncertainly accepted when Baker v. Carr was decided. The
ultimate reason, though, lies in the political setting in which today's
127. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May
Direct: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, & THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 97, at 11 (criticizing the Florida Supreme Court as turning
the "original electoral system, as directed by the legislature, on its head"). Criticism of the
Court's dissenters on this ground is less common, but I have run across it, mostly in the
form of the observation that only someone whose judgment was distorted could fail to
recognize how out of control the Florida Supreme Court was.
128. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 3 (2001) (criticizing the Supreme Court for substituting its
own political judgment for the will of the voting public and arguing that, as a consequence,
the majority undermined the moral authority of the Court); Bruce Ackerman, The Court
Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12,2001, at 48,48.
129. See sources cited in note 127 supra for indications of a commitment among legal
scholars to a theory of strong judicial supremacy.
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I have already emphasized the effect
Court operates."0
doctrinalization has on prudential analysis. The second element we
must examine is the historical setting in which the Court Bickel and
Scharpf analyzed operated, and the setting of today's Court.
Bickel and Scharpf were right to see that the task of combining
prudence and law was particularly important for the time at which
they wrote. They were dealing with a Supreme Court that had only
recently emerged from the crisis precipitated by the Court's
obstruction of the New Deal and that was simultaneously attempting
to redefine the scope of government power by developing civil rights
"'
Bickel's
and civil liberties restrictions on government power.13
mentor Felix Frankfurter was centrally concerned with the legacy of
the pre-New Deal Court, but clearly believed that judicial power
'
For Frankfurter and
should be used to achieve racial justice. 32
calculate when it
carefully
the
Court
that
required
success
Bickel,
that acted
majorities
national
could succeed in disciplining local and
against the vision of civil rights and civil liberties to which Frankfurter
and Bickel were committed.
Sympathetic with the main thrust of the Warren Court's
decisions through the early 1960s, Bickel was concerned that the
Court would not be able to sustain its initiatives unless the Court
acted with prudence. The setting in which he wrote provides the key
to his interest in justiciability doctrines and to their disappearance.
Southern members of Congress had attacked the Court in 1956 over
Brown v. Board of Education."' In 1959 the Conference of State
Chief Justices challenged the Court over some of the Court's
preemption and criminal procedure decisions.Y The Court had
weathered a substantial effort to restrict its jurisdiction in 1958-59,
which Chief Justice Warren later said "came dangerously close to
passing.1 35 Baker v. Carr came in 1962, only four years after the
Court had articulated the strongest theory of judicial supremacy it
could, in response to defiance of its desegregation decisions by the
130. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
131. For essays on the New Deal crisis and the Court's response, see WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBERG,

THE

SUPREME

COURT

REBORN:

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL

(1995).
132. For a discussion of Frankfurter's complex position in the school desegregation

REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

cases of 1954-1955, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD

1936-1961, at 192-93,203-04 (1994).
133. See BICKEL, supra note 1, at 256-58 (quoting the Southern Manifesto).
134. See LUCAS S. POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 203-04
(2000) (describing the reaction to the Court's decisions).
135. 1d at 133 (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,

1232

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

governor of Arkansas. 36 The Court's reapportionment and school
prayer decisions provoked a substantial adverse reaction in
Congress. 13 7
These developments led Bickel to conclude that success in the
Court's reformist enterprise, with which he generally agreed when he
wrote The Least DangerousBranch, required that the Court act with
prudence. Bickel sometimes saw prudence embodied in the Court's
actions, as in its adoption of the "all deliberate speed" formula for
desegregation.'38 But, prudence also sometimes meant that the Court
should not act. Judicial action had to be principled, and sometimes
principle-faithfully adhering to legal principle-would actually lead
the nation astray. Justiciability doctrines would give the Court
additional tools to avoid harm to itself or to the nation.
As it happened, the Court had a different view of what prudence
required than Bickel. He thought that prudence required caution; the
Warren Court thought, probably correctly, that boldness was at least
as prudent a course. Even so, the Warren Court, composed mainly of
seasoned politicians,' 39 agreed with Bickel that the Court was a
political institution.
The Court weathered the assaults on it during the early 1960s.
Since then political liberals, recalling the triumphs of the Warren
Court, and political conservatives, savoring the prospect of getting the
Supreme Court on their side, have gone along with judicial
supremacy 4 Of course, the Court itself has been quite comfortable
in asserting its own supremacy. 141 Nor do any current Justices appear
to believe that law, faithfully invoked, might sometimes be bad for
the country.

136. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,18 (1958).
137. See POWE, supra note 134, at 139 (discussing the Conference criticism).
138. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 247-54.
139. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character,and Experience, 72
B.U. L. REV. 747,757 (1992).
140. The examples I use, somewhat self-defensively, are the reviews of my book,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999), which challenged judicial

supremacy. For liberal reactions defending judicial supremacy, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
Losing Faith. America Without JudicialReview, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1416 passim (2000)
(book review); and James E. Fleming, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 215 passim (2000) (book review); for conservative reactions doing so, see Joan
Larsen, Constitutionalism Without Courts?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 983 passim (2000) (book
review); Saikrishna Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE LJ. 541 passim (1999)
(book review).
141. The best example, because the assertion of judicial supremacy elicited no
disagreement from within the Court, is City ofBoerne v. FMores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Today's version of judicial supremacy, however, has a different
foundation from the one on which the Warren Court rested. As I
have suggested, the Warren Court asserted judicial supremacy
because it believed that judicial supremacy was a politically astute
method of achieving its political goals. In contrast, today's Justices
see the Court as an institution devoted to law alone. The
doctrinalization of justiciability law is untroubling to today's Court,
because it sees no need for approaches-they cannot be called
doctrines-that would allow them to temper law with prudence.
Professor Cass Sunstein, Bickel's jurisprudential heir, has argued
that the Court should incorporate prudence into its decisionmaking. 42 In contrast to Bickel's views, prudence to Sunstein
operates as a component of judgments on the merits. Sometimes,
according to Sunstein, the Court should act boldly-rendering what
Sunstein calls maximalist decisions. However, on certain occasions,
such as when there is a novel but pressing issue that should be
decided on its constitutional merits, the Court should be more
cautious and act in a "minimalist way."143 The reasons that make
minimalism sometimes appropriate, in Sunstein's view, are not
identical to the ones that, for Bickel, should lead to a prudential
abstention from decision on the merits, but they are at least cousins of
Bickel's reasons.
A parallel development has occurred on the Court as well.
Frankfurter's heirs on the Court are today's balancers, who articulate
doctrines that allow them to decide cases on the merits while
preserving the possibility of a different decision should circumstances
change.' 44 For the balancers, that is, prudence is a component of
judgment but not an element of legal doctrine.
In the 1950s and 1960s, balancing decisions were thought to be
conservative relative to the positions taken by the Warren Court
majority and, more important for present purposes, they were
thought to be inconsistent with the demands imposed on judicial
decision-making by the rule of law. 45 The political valence of
142. CASS R.

SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:

JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE

SUPREME COURT 5, 9-14 (1999).

143. 1d
144. Among the Court's recent cases, Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel best illustrates the
balancing phenomenon. 524 U.S. 498,522-38 (1998) (conducting a balancing of factors to
determine whether a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment had
occurred).
145. See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, Is the FirstAmendment Law?-A Reply to Professor
Mendelson, 51 CAL. L. REV. 729,729-32 (1963) (framing "balancing" as a "technique" for
making a purely prudential choice between alternatives that are "equally permissible").
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balancing has changed: Relative to the most prominent advocates of
the rule of law as a law of rules, 146 balancing is a liberal technique.1 47
It is now reasonably common to describe today's Court as a
conservative version of the Warren Court. 48 It is that, but only in a
sense. Like the Warren Court, today's Court has no general
constitutional theory that cautions against invalidating statutes. But
the Warren Court, believing that constitutional law was an exercise in
political decision-making, acted boldly when and because it thought it
could accomplish its political goals by doing so. Today's Court acts
boldly because it believes the law requires it to do so.
Why is today's Court in a position to act in that way? Precisely
because it is not under imminent threat of retaliation. For the
Warren Court, it was a close question whether legislative majorities
could be assembled to challenge the Court's decisions. Today we
have a divided government, which means that court decisions can be
overturned or successfully challenged only if a substantial majority of
the people disagrees with the Court. 49 But, on that question, the facts
surrounding Bush v. Gore can be taken as emblematic. The members
of today's Court know that whatever they do, close to half of the
nation's people will think they did the right thing. After Bush v.
Gore, neither the Court nor its defenders thought it disrespectful to
assume that leaving resolution of the election dispute to Congress
would either provoke or itself be a constitutional crisis.
In
contemporary circumstances, a constitutional jurisprudence of
boldness predicated on refusing to temper
legal with political
50
judgment is a politically sound jurisprudence.

146. The reference here is obviously Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 passim (1989).
147. Again, Gerald Gunther saw this connection first. Gerald Gunther, In Search of
JudicialQuality on a ChangingCourt: The Case of Justice Powell,24 STAN. L. REV. 1001,
1005-06 (1972) (discussing how Justice Harlan employed "balancing" to broaden First
Amendment rights, a tactic emulated by Justice Powell later to strengthen First
Amendment rights and other civil liberties). I suspect that Gunther would have a
different account of the origins of his perception.
148. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle
in ConstitutionalLaw, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (1998); Donald H. Zeigler, The New
Activist Court,45 AM. U. L. REv. 1367 passim (1996).
149. For an introduction to the argument, see Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New
ConstitutionalOrder and the Chastening of ConstitutionalAmbition, 113 HARV. L. REV.
29, 63-107 (1999) (demonstrating that change in the Court's political role by contrasting it
with the Warren Court and the New Deal/Great Society regime).
150. Why today's Justices believe-if they do-that faithful adherence to law can never
damage the nation is another question, and one to which I have no answer.
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CONCLUSION

The story of Baker v. Carr combines two elements. First,
doctrinalization substantially reduced the possibility of the Court's
deploying the political question and standing doctrines in the service
of prudential judgments about what would be the best structures of
governance in a democratic society. Second, the Warren Court's
legacy was a theory of judicial supremacy accepted along every point
of the political spectrum. No one likes every Supreme Court
decision, but everyone hopes-in my view, against hope-that the
Court will eventually decide every case in accordance with her own
views. No one, therefore, is willing to say that judicial supremacy is in
principle a bad thing. When Bickel wrote a generation or two ago,
that possibility was available in the legal and political culture. I think
we should retrieve it, but I do not think we will.
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